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I. ABSTRACT 
The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) was enacted in 
2010 and came into effect on January 1, 2013. 1 F ATCA is by far the most 
extraordinary example of Congressional extraterritorial legislation in U.S. 
history. Eschewing the traditional practice in international law of limiting 
national legislation to the territory of the sovereign, the U.S. Congress 
explicitly crafted F ATCA to impose egregious, continuing due diligence 
and reporting obligations on more than 100,000 financial institutions, each 
of which is organized and operates outside the territory of the United States. 
FATCA is designed to increase U.S. income tax compliance by American 
tax payers holding financial assets outside the United States. 
This article briefly outlines the requirements of F ATCA, describes the 
outcry by American expatriates to the unintended consequences ofF A TCA 
as well as the predicament of "accidental" and "incidental." Americans 
who find themselves subject to years of-unpaid obligations imposed by the 
unique approach to taxation contained in the Internal Revenue Code. The 
article concludes by describing a potentially monumental unintended 
consequence ofF ATCA, the end of the centuries old practice of sovereigns 
refusing to enforce revenue laws of other sovereigns as the developed world 
joins together to arrange mutual FATCA-like reporting to enhance tax 
collection efforts globally. 
II. INTRODUCTION 
A bank employee surreptitiously collects the names of thousands of 
owners' secret accounts in a Swiss bank on five CD-ROMs. Offering this 
data to the governments in Europe the employee seeks to become an instant 
millionaire. Within three months he dies of a "heart attack," at age twenty-
nine. Plot line of a new thriller? Not yet. But Herve Falciani, whom the 
New York Times riamed "the Edward Snowden ofbanking,"2 does claim to 
have encrypted records of 130,000 such account holders.3 Shortly after 
former French Minister of Finance, Christine Lagarde, shared a list of about 
2,000 wealthy Greek tax evaders with the Greek government, two 
prominent Greek citizens said to have been on this "Lagarde list," died; one 
1. FATCA Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), DEWITTE (2011), available at 
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/dcom-unitedstates/localo/o20assetsldocwnents/tax/us _tax_ fate a_ fuqs 
_ 0617ll.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 20 15). 
2. Doreen Carvajal & Raphael Minder, A Whistle-Blower Who Can Name Names of Swiss Bank 
Account Holders, N.Y. TiMES (Aug. 8, 2013}, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/09/business/globaVa-
whistle-blower-who-can-name-narnes-of-swiss-bank-account-holders.html?pagewanted=all&pagewanted= 
print (last visited Feb. 4, 20 15). 
3. !d. 
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"apparently hanged himself," the second "was found dead in a Jakarta hotel 
room" five days later.4 
The existence of untaxed offshore accounts has been known for years. 
International criminals and larcenous national political leaders are familiar 
figures in novels, movies and television dramas and were the trigger for 
action by Congress to enact the Financial Account Tax Compliance Act, 
uniformly referred to as "FATCA."5 Enacted in 2010, but effective only 
since January 2013,6 FATCA has engendered a maelstrom of comment and 
criticism. This article presents a basic introduction to FA TCA, one of the 
most egregious examples of U.S. legal imperialism-the extraterritorial 
application of American federal legislation. 
Part III provides the background to FA TCA, focusing on the 
popularity of offshore accounts, the contribution of those accounts to the 
billion dollar U.S. tax gap, and what the Department of Treasury and IRS 
have attempted to do in order to encourage citizens with offshore accounts 
to comply with their obligations under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). 
Part IV provides an overview of the mechanics of FATCA, explaining the 
goal of F ATCA and the penalty for noncompliance, with an emphasis on 
the unprecedented nature of this legislation, which imposes significant 
obligations on entities not subject to the jurisdiction of American 
lawmakers. Part V reviews a small portion of the criticism that has been 
generated by FA TCA and how it is affecting American expatriates, 
financial institutions, and "accidental" or "incidental" Americans. Finally, 
Part VI discusses the possible reach of F ATCA beyond its direct 
implications on foreign financial institutions and American account holders, 
particularly its effect on global information exchange, the erosion of bank 
secrecy laws, and the decline ofthe dollar as the de facto world currency. 
III. BACKGROUND OF THE FOREIGN ACCOUNT TAX COMPLIANCE ACT 
As noted on the official Internal Revenue Service (IRS) website, Will 
Rogers observed, "[ i]ncome tax has made more liars out of the American 
people than golf."7 As another anonymous pundit has said, "[w]e know 
4. Tony Paterson, Mysterious death in Jakarta hotel of second man exposed on 'Lagarde list', 
INDEPENDENT (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/mysterious-death-in-
jakarta-hotel-of--second-man-exposed-on-lagarde-list-8204537.html (last visited Feb. 4, 20 15). 
5. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY (Dec. 8, 2014) 
http://www. treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/F A TCA.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 
2015). 
6. FATCAFAQs,supranote I. 
7. Tax Quotes, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Tax-Quotes (last visited Feb. 4, 2015). 
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there are but two kinds of people who complain about taxes: men and 
women."8 
Based upon this telling commentary suggesting that Americans may 
not enjoy paying income taxes, one way for a few Americans to reduce 
income taxes paid to the IRS has apparently been to sequester funds outside 
the territorial limits of the United States. People associate such offshore 
accounts with sophisticated criminals and money laundering, spies, and 
corrupt third world politicians. But in the view of the IRS, many American 
foreign account holders who do not self-identify as spies, criminals or 
politicians seek to reduce their personal income taxes by stashing funds in 
Switzerland and elsewhere. And what about the reported 7.2 million U.S. 
citizens living abroad?9 Surely, most of them have one or more bank 
accounts. 10 Profits made on funds invested from and retained in such 
accounts, and interest accrued thereon, have historically been outside the 
third party reporting systems the IRS has in place to encourage tax 
compliance. 
A. How Much Are We Talking About? 
Just how much might be in umeported offshore accounts? It turns out 
we can learn more about the sex lives of the rich and famous than we can 
know about such secret bank accounts. One estimate from the Tax Justice 
Network, however, reports that total offshore "financial wealth" may range 
from $21 to $32 trillion. 11 This estimate is of all such hidden wealth, not 
just that sequestered away by Americans seeking to escape the IRS. Even 
this estimate may be conservative, because, as the Tax Justice Network 
notes, there are "difficulties in measuring secret practices," and other 
limitations on "night vision.'m The U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigations published a report in 2014 that included the estimate that 
lost tax revenues of all types range from $40 to $70 billion annually. 13 
8. /d. (Who knew the IRS had a sense of humor?). 
9. Laura Sanders, Offihore Accounts: No Place to Hide?, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2013), 
available at http://online.wsj.corn!articles/SBIOOOI42412788732480770457908551 1331606786 (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2015). 
10. /d. 
II. The Price of Offshore, Revisited- supplementary notes June 20/4, TAX JUSTICE NETWORK 
(June 5, 2014), available at http://www.taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/The-Price-of-
Offshore-Revisited-notes-2014.pdf(last visited Feb. 4, 2015). 
12. /d. at2. 
13. U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Offshore Tax Evasion: The Effort to 
Collect Unpaid Taxes on Billions in Hidden Offshore Accounts, HOMELAND SEC. & GoVERNMENTAL 
AFFAIRS PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS 9 (Feb. 26, 2014), available at 
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Confirming the inexactitude of such estimates, an earlier estimate cited by 
this same Subcommittee on Investigations in 2008 estimated the annual loss 
of $100 billion. 14 
The United States has an estimated annual budget deficit of over $500 
billion15 and one means of reducing this deficit, without raising taxes, is to 
collect unpaid taxes. 16 F ATCA focuses on taxes believed to be unpaid by 
individuals with assets hidden outside the United States. 17 Given that there 
is at the moment no effective way to track such accounts, F ATCA is 
specifically designed to deal with this information deficit by imposing 
extensive reporting obligations upon foreign financial institutions (FFis). 18 
B. Tax Havens: Where the Money Hides 
Switzerland has long been a favorite tax haven for the wealthiest of the 
world19 and plays a vital role in the tax evasion game.20 In 2012, the Swiss 
Bankers Association reported that Switzerland's 300 banks held $2.8 
trillion in assets.21 The country's bank secrecy laws are notoriously strict22 
and make it a crime for a bank to release information about clients and their 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigationslhearings/offshore-tax-evasion-the-effort-to-
collect-tmpaid-taxes-on-billions-in-hidden-offshore-accotmts (last visited Feb. 5, 2015) [hereinafter Offshore 
Tax Evasion]. This estimate is for taxes avoided by individuals. It is not an estimate of offshore assets, but 
oflost tax revenue to the IRS. 
14. U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax 
Compliance, HOMELAND SEC. & GoVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON 
INvESTIGATIONS I (2008), available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov//imo/media/doc/ 
071708PSIReport.pdf(last visited Feb. 5, 2015). 
15. Offshore Tax Evasion, supra note 13. 
16. It is interesting to consider why Congress determined to add perhaps $500 to $700 million 
to annual tax collections through FA TCA when there are much larger sources of offshore tax which 
might have been addressed and which would potentially tap a much greater annual tax stream. 
17. FATCA, supra note 5. 
18. See 26 U.S.C. § 1471 (2012). 
19. Arotmd $2.1 trillion in offshore wealth sits in Swiss banks. Swiss Banking Secrecy: Don 't 
ask, won't tell, ECONOMIST (Feb. 11, 2012), available at http://www.economist.com/node/21547229 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2015). 
20. Offshore Tax Evasion, supra note 13, at 30. 
21. Id. 
22. Financial Security Index, TAX JUSTICE NETWORK (2013), 
http://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/introduction/fsi-2013-results (last visited Feb. 7, 2013). The Tax 
Justice Network ranked Switzerland first out of eighty-two jurisdictions on its Financial Secrecy Index. 
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accounts,23 creating a secure and tax-evasion friendly sanctuary for those 
subject to U.S. and other nations' tax laws.24 But in our internet world, 
"offshore" no longer refers exclusively to physical locations; rather, the 
offshore systems of the modem world prevail wherever clients can find 
"secrecy, tax minimization, access, asset management, and security."25 
Before we judge too harshly (and perhaps secretly envy on some level) 
our tax-evading fellow Americans, let us not forget that there is nothing 
illegal about having funds overseas and there are multiple reasons for 
having assets outside the United States.26 Wherever assets are, for 
American taxpayers, the reality is that they are subject to the provisions of 
the IRC. 27 FA TCA is designed to identify offshore financial assets. Within 
the territory of the U.S., the IRS is able to encourage faithful compliance 
with a resident's income tax obligations by imposing third party reporting 
obligations directly to the IRS upon banks, employers, brokerage firms, et 
cetera.28 While this system is not perfect, it permits cost effective 
confirmation of tax returns actually filed, thus encouraging accurate filing. 
Such third party reporting has not been available for earnings of U.S. 
citizens received from outside the territory of the United States.29 FATCA 
addresses this reporting gap by seeking to impose such reporting 
obligations upon tens of thousands of institutions with no jurisdictional 
nexus to the United States.30 
23. Maurice Aubert, The Limits of Swiss Banking under Domestic and International Law, 2 
INT'L. TAX & Bus. L. 273, 275 (1984) ("[B]anks must not disclose to third parties, whether private 
persons or government authorities, information subject to secrecy."). 
24. !d. 
25. James S. Henry, The Price of Offshore Revisited*, TAX JUSTICE NETWORK 10 (2012), 
available at http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdfi'Price _of_ Offshore_ Revisited _120722.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2015). 
26. See Nick Giambruno, 10 Reasons Why You Need an Offshore Bank Account, INT'L. MAN, 
http://www.intemationalman.cornlarticles/1 0-reasons-why-you-need-an-offshore-bank-account (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2015). 
27. See 26 U.S.C. § 1471; 26 l.R.C. § 61(a) (2012) ("[I]ncome from whatever source 
derived'); Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 56 (1924) (upholding constitutionality of imposing taxes on 
income outside the United States). 
28. Third Party Reporting Information Center-Information Documents, IRS (Feb. 5, 2015), 
http://www.irs.gov/Tax-Professionals!Third-Party-Reporting-Information-Center (last visited Feb. 5, 
2015). 
29. See generally 78 Fed. Reg. 5873, 5874 (Feb. 5, 2013). 
30. !d. at 5877. 
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C. Prior Efforts at Achieving Offihore Account Compliance 
The IRS has struggled to effectively enforce the provisions of the IRC 
on citizens with offshore accounts.31 The Tax Division of the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) has made increased compliance by U.S. taxpayers with 
offshore accounts a top priority in recent years, as evidenced by the 
programs described below.32 No need to wonder if any of these attempts 
were fool proof-the arrival of F ATCA tells us everything we need to 
know regarding the success of these programs. While each may have been 
marginally successful and their results impressive to the untrained eye, the 
financial world would not be weathering the FA TCA storm if any of these 
prior compliance initiatives had been successful in its attempt to achieve 
full tax compliance. A primer on the history of compliance programming 
provides some basis to understand the intensity ofF A TCA. 
1. Foreign Bank Account Report 
Early efforts to deal with offshore accounts held by Americans include 
the Foreign Bank Account Report (FBAR) first mandated in 1970 by the 
Bank Secrecy Act.33 The FBAR is not an IRS form. 34 It is a form required 
by the Treasury Department.35 This now exclusively electronic form, 
FinCEN Form 114, must be filed each year separately from income tax 
filings with the IRS.36 The U.S. Treasury Department's Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) receives these forms, although FBAR 
compliance enforcement is the responsibility of the IRS with its 90,000 plus 
employees.37 Penalties for failing to comply with FBAR reporting were 
increased in 2004, "[b ]ecause of a concern about the low level of . . . 
compliance."38 The purpose of the FBAR mandate is to collect information 
31. Offshore Compliance Initiative, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/tax/ 
offshore_compliance_intiative.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2015). 
32. !d. 
33. 31 U.S.C. § 5314(a). 
34. !d. 
35. /d. 
36. See Publication, Internal Revenue Service U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, 4261 (REV. 2-20 14), 
available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p426l.pdf(last visited Feb. 5, 2015). 
37. See Kenneth Thomas, A Big IRS Job and Fewer People to Do It, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP. (May 30, 20 13), http://www. usnews.corn!opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/20 13/05/30/staff-
shortage-threatens-irs-performance (last visited Feb. 5, 2015). 
38. Michael S. Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad: Reconciling 
Principle and Practice, 16 FLA. TAX REv. 117, 147 (2014). Because the FBAR is to be filed each year, 
civil and criminal penalties for failing to file FBARs may easily exceed the amount in the account. 
Penalties under prior amnesty programs disproportionately hit the smaller accounts. Robert W. Wood, 
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to aid in exposing money laundering and terrorist financing. 39 FBAR filing 
continues to be required for U.S. citizens with foreign accounts, but the 
self-reporting system is insufficient and ineffective on its own.40 
2. Qualified Intermediaries 
Pursuant to Treasury Regulation 1.1441-1,41 the IRS attempted to 
enlist foreign banks in a reporting scheme to provide the identity of U.S. 
citizens having offshore bank accounts with the Qualified Intermediary 
Program. 42 The program required foreign banks to report details of 
accounts registered in the names of American citizens, but excluded 
identities of non-U.S. clients and corporations if the FFI found that the 
appropriate amount of tax was being withheld on payments deemed to be 
paid from a "U.S. source"43 to the non-U.S. clients.44 Not surprisingly, 
international banks quickly found ways to defeat the program and aid their 
U.S. clients by suggesting and encouraging loopholes to avoid exposure.45 
New IRS Offshore Amnesty Announced: Third Time's a Charm, FORBES.COM (Jan. 9, 2012), available 
at http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2012/0l/09/new-irs-offshore-arnnesty-announced-third-
times-a-charm/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2015). 
39. 
(2014). 
Tracy A. Kaye, Innovations in the War on Tax Evasion, 2014 BYU L. REv. 363, 367 
40. Melissa A. Dizdarevic, The FATCA Provisions of the Hire Act: Boldly Going Where No 
Withholding Has Gone Before, 79 FORDHAM L. REv. 2967 (2011). 
41. 26 C.F.R. § 1.441-1 (2003). 
42. 0./fthore Tax Evasion, supra note 13, at 10. Participation in the QI program required 
foreign financial institutions to enter into a standardized agreement with the IRS, agreeing to comply 
with withholding obligations of U.S. tax law and implement "Know-Your-Customer" policies to 
identify account holders with U.S. source income. 
43. /d. at 13. 
U.S. source income refers to income that originates in the United States, such as 
dividends paid on U.S. stock; capital gains paid on sales of U.S. stock or real 
estate; royalties paid on U.S. assets; rent paid on U.S. property; interest paid on 
U.S. deposits; and other types of fixed, determinable, annual, or periodic income. 
44. Joshua D. Blank & Ruth Mason, U.S. Nat'/. Rep. on Exchange of Information 2 (Law & 
Economics Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 14-22, 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2481080 (last visited.Feb. 5, 2015). 
45. Offshore Tax Evasion, supra note 13, at 16. 
[T]he banks ... helped some U.S. clients engage in the massive sell-off of their 
U.S. securities; helped others establish offshore structures to assume nominal 
ownership of their accounts and treated them as non-U.S. accounts outside the 
Q.l. reporting regime; and helped many U.S. clients maintain undeclared accounts 
despite evidence they were hiding assets from the IRS. 
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American whistleblower Bradley Birkenfeld,46 who had previously 
worked for the Swiss bank UBS, exposed a scheme created by UBS 
encouraging account holders subject to U.S. tax to create shell corporations 
outside of the United States and open UBS accounts in the foreign 
corporation's name.47 Without a U.S. person as the actual account holder, 
UBS determined that payments made to the shell corporations were not 
subject to withholdings, even though the bank was well aware that the 
beneficial owners were U.S. citizens subject to the IRC.48 The subsequent 
investigation of UBS by the Justice Department ultimately led to a deferred 
prosecution agreement for UBS and a $780 million fine, including 
penalties, interest and restitution.49 The DOJ press release boasting of the 
successful prosecution of UBS did not acknowledge the key role of 
Birkenfeld.50 
3. Voluntary Disclosure 
Taking full advantage of the media's coverage of Birkenfeld's 
approach to the IRS, the unprecedented UBS deferred prosecution 
agreement and concerns among Americans, both domestically and those 
residing abroad, the IRS established the Overseas Voluntary Disclosure 
Program (OVDP) in 2009.51 This program was reopened with less 
advantageous terms in 2011 and again in 2012.52 These programs provided 
incentives directly to U.S. taxpayers, including reduced civil penalties and 
freedom from criminal prosecution for voluntary disclosure of previously 
46. Blank & Mason, supra note 44, at 2. 
47. !d. 
48. !d. 
49. !d. 
50. Erik Larson & Carlyn Kolker, UBS Tax Fraud Case Whistleblower Gets 40-Month Prison 
Sentence, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 21, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive 
&sid=aqRUmD2LzH.E (last visited Feb. 5, 2015) (For his role at UBS Birkenfeld served more than two 
years in prison. Birkenfeld's imprisonment has been widely criticized by the National Whistleblowers' 
Center. His request for leniency was supported by Senator Carl Levin, Chairman of the Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations who has played a key role in seeking a solution to the failure 
of some to report their offshore wealth, as well representatives of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and the IRS). Notwithstanding this example of bureaucratic hubris, shortly after his 
parole, the IRS paid Birkenfeld $104 million as his (taxable) whistleblower award. Laura Saunders & 
Robin Side!, Whistleblower Gets $104 Million, WALL ST. J. (Sept. II, 2012), available at 
http:/ /online.wsj .com/news/articles/SB 100008723963904440175045776454!2614237708 (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2015). 
51. Offihore Tax Evasion, supra note 13, at 19-21. 
52. !d. 
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unreported offshore accounts.53 The incentives were reduced with each 
successive issuance of the program,54 but the IRS has reported collecting in 
excess of $5 billion from 33,000 participants in these OVDPs.SS The 
incentives that these OVDPs offered, avoiding maximum civil and all 
criminal penalties, were obviously effective, and a significant portion of the 
success of the OVDPs no doubt arose from the Birkenfeld publicity. 56 
Despite the compliance generated by these programs mentioned above, 
it is naive to think that UBS was the sole abuser of the QI program, or that 
33,000 voluntary disclosure participants make up the whole of U.S. tax 
evaders.57 The limited success of the QI and OVDP programs has led to the 
remarkably more aggressive and innovative mechanisms ofF A TCA. 58 
IV. HOW FACTA IS SUPPOSED TO WORK 
The IRS relies upon voluntary tax compliance by individual 
taxpayers. 59 This voluntariness is bolstered by mandated confirmatory 
reporting directly to the IRS of taxable income by employers and financial 
institutions, enabling a precise, computer-based accuracy check on amounts 
reported by taxpayers.6° For U.S. citizens with accounts outside the United 
States, such confirmatory reporting has not been available. Tax treaties and 
Tax Information Exchange Agreements have been negotiated to deal with 
tangential aspects of the problem of overseas assets controlled by U.S. 
taxpayers, but these approaches did not deal with unreported, hidden 
offshore assets.61 While the problem of unreported assets offshore has been 
53. /d. at 19. 
54. /d. at 19-20 (The penalty rate rose from 20% of the highest aggregate value of the 
financial account in 2009 to 25% and 27.5% in 2011 and 2012, respectively). 
55. IRS Says Offshore Effort Tops $5 Billion, Announces New Details on the Voluntary 
Disclosure Program and Closing of Offshore Loophole, IRS (June 26, 2012), 
http://www.irs.gov/uac!IRS-Says-Offshore-Effort-Tops-$5-Billion,-Announces-New-Details-on-the-
Voluntary-Disclosure-Program-and-Ciosing-of-Offshore-Loophole (last visited Jan. 23, 2015). 
56. Offshore Tax Evasion, supra note 13, at 19; see also Blank & Mason, supra note 44 at, 2. 
57. Helen Burggraf, IRS Watchdog Says Agency's Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Schemes 
Too Harsh, INT'L ADVISOR (Jan. 12, 2014), http://www.international-adviser.com/news/tax---
regulation/irs-watchdog-says-its-offshore-voluntary (last visited Jan. 29, 2015). In 2012, the IRS 
received 807,040 FBAR filings, far below the reported 7.2 million U.S. citizens living abroad and other 
U.S. residents required to file FBARs. 
58. Blank & Mason, supra note 44, at 3. 
59. Flora v. U.S., "362 U.S. 145, 176 (1960). 
60. Third Party Reporting Information Center, supra note 28. 
61. Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs), OECD.ORG, 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/taxinformationexchangeagreementstieas.htm (last 
visited Jan. 29, 20 15). 
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known for decades, prior measures have not begun to solve this issue for 
the IRS. 62 Enter FA TCA. 
After years of talk and numerous Congressional hearings, FA TCA was 
fmally introduced in 2009 by Representatives Charles Rangel ofNew York 
and Richard E. Neal of Massachusetts.63 Additional hearings on the 
offshore tax problems of the IRS were held and F ATCA was ultimately 
enacted as an addendum to the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment 
Act (HIRE Act) and signed by President Obama on March 18,2010.64 Why 
such an unlikely juxtaposition? Congress added FATCA to the HIRE Act 
to appear to "offset" the cost of the HIRE Act. 65 Of course, F ATCA was 
not fully implemented until July 1, 2014.66 In considering this offset, the 
Congressional Budget Office somehow determined that while FA TCA 
would increase the U.S. deficit by $11.4 billion between 2010 and 2015, it 
would conveniently yield a "net reduction in deficits of $1.1 billion over the 
2010-2020 period."67 Thus did FATCA become law. 
A. Basic Mechanics ofFATCA 
The basic requirements of FA TCA command foreign financial 
institutions and certain other non-financial foreign entities (NFFE) to 
disclose information directly to the IRS about financial accounts held by 
62. Citizens for Tax Justice Staff, Chairman of Senate Finance and House Ways and Means 
Committees Introduce Watered-Down Legislation to Address Tax Havens, TAX JUSTICE BLOG (Oct. 29, 
2009), http://www. taxjusticeblog.org/archive/2009/1 0/chairmen _of_ senate_ finance_ and.php#. 
VI8QqVbVvBc (last visited Jan. 23, 2015). 
63. /d. Note the irony/hypocrisy of such a bill being sponsored by Congressman Rangel, 
whose offshore and domestic tax problems have been clearly documented. See, e.g., James King, 
Charlie Rangel, Legendary Tax Cheat, Lectures Mitt Romney on Paying Taxes, VILLAGE VOICE BLOG 
(Sept. 18. 20 12), http://hlogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/20 12/09/charlie _range!_ 8.php (last visited 
Jan. 23, 2015); see also Morality and Charlie Rangel's Taxes," WALL ST. J. (July 27, 2009), 
http://online,wsj.com/news/articles/SB 10001424052970203946904574300013592601036 (last visited 
Jan. 23, 2015). 
64. HIRE Act: Questions and Answers for Employers, IRS (Oct. 14, 2014), 
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed!HIRE-Act-Questions-and-Answers-
for-Employers (last visited Feb. 4, 2015). 
65. The economics of this is indefensible, but it is our Congress. See Letter from Douglas W. 
Elmendorf, Director of Congression Budget Office, to Harry Reid, Senate Majority Leader (Feb. 18, 
2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/defau1t/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/112xx/docll230/hr2847.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 4, 2015). The CBO letter describing the impact of Hire Act shows this offset growing 
gradually from $343 million to $1.048 billion in 2017. Thereafter, the offset amazingly jumps by $1.7 
billion to $2.855 billion in 2018 and by more than $1.9 billion to $4.812 billion in 2019. 
66. FATCAFAQs,supranote I. 
67. No calls for Congressional accuracy or honesty so this so called "offset" merits no further 
analysis. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, supra note 65. 
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U.S. taxpayers or face harsh penalties.68 The IRS has sought to make 
certain that no potentially qualifying institutions will slip through the cracks 
by including the broadest possible definition of "foreign financial 
institution" in F ATCA. 69 A "foreign financial institution" is any "financial 
institution which is a foreign entity."70 A "financial institution" is "any 
entity that accepts deposits, holds financial assets for others or is engaged 
primarily in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities, 
partnership interests, commodities or any interest in such securities.'m The 
mechanics of F ATCA compliance are daunting all around and no attempt 
will be made in this article to detail them. Broadly speaking, to achieve 
initial compliance foreign banks must enter into an agreement with the 
IRS,72 determine which of their accounts are "U.S. Reportable Accounts,'m 
and categorize the individuals and entities having accounts with that 
institution according to F ATCA. 74 
As just one example of what FA TCA requires, foreign banks must 
identify all "U.S. persons" who have accounts in excess of $50,000.15 U.S. 
68. 78 Fed. Reg. at 5873. 
69. Seeid. 
70. 26 U.S.C. § 147l(d)(4) ("Foreign financial institution: The term "foreign financial 
institution" means any financial institution which is a foreign entity. Except as otherwise provided by 
the Secretary, such term shall not include a fmancial institution which is organized under the laws of any 
possession of the U.S.") (emphasis added). 
71. !d. at § 14 71 (d)( 5). Except as otherwise provided by the Secretary, the term "financial 
institution" means any entity that: 
(A) accepts deposits in the ordinary course of a banking or similar business; 
(B) as a substantial portion of its business, holds fmancial assets for the account 
of others; or 
(C) is engaged (or holding itself out as being engaged) primarily in the business 
of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities (as defined in section 475(c)(2) 
without regard to the last sentence thereof), partnership interests, commodities (as 
defined in section 475(e)(2)), or any interest (including a futures or forward 
contract or option) in such securities, partnership interests, or commodities. 
72. 78 Fed. Reg. at 5874. 
73. Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government 
of [FATCA Partner] to Improve International Tax Compliance and to Implement FATCA, U.S. DEPT. 
·oF TREASURY (June 6, 2014), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/treaties/Documents!F ATCA-Reciprocal-Model-1 A-Agreement-Preexisting-TIEA-or-DTC-6-6-
14.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2015) ("U.S. Reportable Accounts" is defined as "a Financial Account 
maintained by a Reporting [FATCA Partner] Financial Institution and held by one or more Specified 
U.S. Persons v• by a Non-U.S. Entity with one or more Controlling Persons that is a Specified U.S. 
Person."). 
74. 78 Fed. Reg. at 5875. 
75. !d. at 5876 ("The final regulations exempt from review entirely any preexisting accounts 
held by individuals with a balance or value of $50,000 or less."). 
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persons who trigger the FFI due diligence and reporting obligations for 
FFis include U.S. legal entities of every kind, plus U.S. citizens.76 
This is a continuing requirement and thus some means of continuously 
tracking the amounts in accounts of U.S. persons will need to be 
established. One additional consequence of FATCA is that FFis will 
henceforth need to conduct more extensive due diligence on new customers 
to determine whether they are "U.S. persons.'m Current "know your 
customer" practices in place to deal with local Anti Money Laundering 
protocols will not be sufficient.78 As to existing accounts, the burdens are 
at least as cumbersome. Each FFI must search its existing accounts for 
"indicia" which might suggest that the account is associated with a U.S. 
person.79 Such indicia include a statement that the account holder is a U.S. 
citizen80 or resident, a U.S. telephone number or mailing address, and 
76. !d. at 5875 (see Part liLA). 
77. 26 U.S.C. § 1471(b)(l)(A}-(B); see also Regulations Relating to Information Reporting by 
Foreign Financial Institutions and Withholding on Certain Payments to Foreign Financial Institutions 
and Other Foreign Entities, IRS § III (Apr. 8, 2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/irb/2013-
15_IRB/arl6.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2015). "Section 147l(b)(l)(A) and (B) requires an FFI that 
enters into an FFI agreement (a participating FFI) to identify its U.S. accounts and comply with 
verification and due diligence procedures prescribed by the Secretary." 
78. Annex I: Due Diligence <?bligations for Identifying and Reporting on U.S. Reportable 
Accounts and on Payments to Certain Nonparticipating Financial Institutions, U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY 
(Nov. 4, 2013), available at http://www.D.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents!FATCA-
Annex-I-to-Model-l-Agreernent-ll-4-13.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2015) [hereinafter Annex I]. Under 
Model 1 IGA, a reporting FFI must conduct an electronic records search of "lower value accounts" 
(accounts with a balance or value greater than $50,000 but Jess than $1,000,000) for any U.S. indicia 
including U.S. citizenship or residency; unambiguous indication of U.S. birth place; current U.S. 
mailing or residence address; current U.S. telephone number; instructions to transfer funds to an account 
maintained in the U.S.; power of attorney or signatory authority granted to person with a U.S. address; 
or "in-care-of' or "hold mail" address that is the sole address on file for the account holder. In addition 
to the electronic records search, a paper record search must also be conduct on "higher value accounts" 
(accounts with a balance or value greater than $1,000,000) if the electronic records search does not 
capture the account holder's nationality or residence status; the account bolder's residence address and 
mailing address currently on file; the account holder's current telephone number on file; whether there 
are standing instructions to transfer funds in the account to another account; whether there is a current 
"in-care-of' or "hold mail" address; and whether here is any power of attorney or signatory power for 
the account. 
79. !d. at I. 
80. US CONST. amend. XIV, § I (Each person born in the United States is by default a U.S. 
citizen pursuant to Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution); 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c) 
(2012) (A person born outside of the United States who has two parents who are U.S. citizens, one of 
whom is a resident of the United States, is a citizen of the United States); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1401(d) 
[A] person born outside of the U.S. and its outlying possessions of parents one of 
whom is a citizen of the U.S. who bas been physically present in the U.S. or one 
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certain other suspicious items, such as a power of attorney with a U.S. 
address or a mailing address which is "in care of' or to a hold mail 
address.81 
Well aware of the enormity of obligations it was imposing upon the 
rest of the world, Congress carefully crafted a draconian penalty to insure 
compliance.82 This enforcement mechanism has been called a "death 
sentence"83 and "[devastatingly] destructive . . . . "84 FA TCA provides in 
sections 14 71 and 14 72 of the IRC that "non-compliant" FFis, NFFEs and 
individuals who have not conformed to the requirements imposed on these 
non-American businesses by a foreign legislature will be subject to a thirty-
percent withholding penalty to be imposed on any U.S. source payments 
made to the institution.85 
B. Imperial Legislation 
1. Beyond Our Borders 
F ATCA is the most extraordinary extension of Congressional 
extraterritorial overreach ever enacted. Traditionally, acts of Congress are 
deemed to apply only domestically unless there is an explicit intention to 
have an impact beyond the territory of the United States.86 
One such law where the extraterritorial impact was clearly set forth is 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which deals with acts of 
of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of one year prior to the birth of 
such person, and the other of whom is a national, but not a citizen of the U.S.; 
8 U.S.C. § 140l(e) 
[A] person born in an outlying possession of the U.S. of parents one of whom is a 
citizen of the U.S. who has been physically present in the U.S. or one of its 
outlying possessions for a continuous period of one year at any time prior to the 
birth of such person. 
81. Supplemental Notice to Notice 2010-60 Providing Further Guidance and Requesting 
Comments on Certain Priority Issues Under Chapter 4 of Subtitle A of the Code, IRS 10 (May 9, 2011), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-11-34.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2015). 
82. Robert W. Wood, FATCA Registration Goes Online, FORBES.COM (Aug. 23, 2013), 
available at http:/ /www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/20 13/08/23/fatca-registration -goes-online/ (last 
visited Jan. 23, 20 15). 
83. !d. 
84. Andrew F. Quinlan, FATCA and US Fiscal Imperialism Threaten To Sink Global 
Economy, THE DAILY CALLER (Mar. 19, 2013), available at http://dailycaller.com/2013/03/19/fatca-
and-us-fiscal-imperialism-threaten-to-sink-global-economy/2/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2015). 
85. 26 u.s.c. §§ 1471-72 (2012). 
86. See K.iobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013). 
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Americans and certain other "U.S. persons"87 in dealings beyond the 
borders of the United States where bribes are paid to foreign government 
officials.88 The FCPA and analogous legislation in numerous other 
jurisdictions enacted to comply with the OECD Convention against Bribery 
of Foreign Government Officials in International Business Transactions89 
must criminalize acts by or on behalf of persons and entities subject to such 
laws if they provide anything of value to a foreign government official in 
hopes of obtaining or retaining business or obtaining an unfair advantage.90 
While the FCP A deals with conduct involving foreign government officials 
that is likely to occur outside the territorial limits of the United States, this 
law carefully and notably does not impact the foreign officials themselves, 
presumably because Congress has no authority to legislate for foreign 
officials.9I The focus of the FCP A is on acts of persons, including legal 
entitles, over which the United States has traditional territorial 
jurisdiction.92 The law deals with the conduct of such persons subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States even though the act of bribery giving rise 
to an offense may occur offshore, outside the territorial limits of the United 
States.93 
In stark contrast, FA TCA seeks to require financial institutions with no 
jurisdictional nexus to the United States whatsoever, to report account 
activity of a broad range of persons and entities to the IRS.94 There is no 
doubt that in FA TCA, Congress clearly and explicitly determined that the 
U.S. Government was going to impose its will on many tens of thousands 
87. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(g)(2) (2012) ("[T]he term 'U.S. person' means a national of the U.S .. 
. . or any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated 
organization, or sole proprietorship organized under the laws of the U.S. or any State, territory, 
possession, or commonwealth of the U.S., or any political subdivision thereof."). 
88. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An Overview, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2015). 
89. Mark Pieth & Huguette Labelle, Veiwpoint: Making Sure that Bribes Don't Pay, 
THOMSON REUTERS FOUNDATION (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.trust.org/item/?map=viewpoint-making-
sure-that-bribes-dont-pay (last visited Jan. 23, 2015) ("All 40 parties have passed laws making foreign 
bribery a crime."). 
90. See, e.g., Matthew W. Muma, Toward Greater Guidance: Reforming the Definitions Of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 112 MICH. L. REv. 1337, 1338 (2014). 
91. U.S. v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831, 836 (5th Cir. 1991) (confirming that the FCPA does not 
permit prosecution of foreign officials, even for conspiracy to violate the FCPA). 
92. 
(f)( I). 
93. 
94. 
15 U.S.C. § 78m(h)(l) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(g)(2) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(g)(2). 
26 u.s.c. § 147l(d). 
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of private organizations, wherever located on our small planet.95 As of 
October 6, 2014, a total of 116,104 FFis have completed their FATCA 
registration with the IRS. 96 
While much of the world realizes the preeminence of the United States 
in many areas, why would the 28,045 FFis in the Cayman Islands,97 or even 
the single registered FFI on Christmas Island,98 bother to go through the 
inconvenience and expense99 of registering its existence with, and agreeing 
to comply with, the onerous regulations issued by the IRS? One possible 
explanation might be that compliance with FATCA might be simple and 
perhaps even a positive marketing development. This however, is most 
definitely not the case. F ATCA imposes obligations, discussed above, 
which are both are extensive and expensive to satisfy. 100 Why then have 
more than 100,000 foreign banks and other financial institutions succumbed 
to this extraordinary exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by a foreign 
government? 
The wrath of FATCA leaves FFis with little or no room to "just say 
no" to the IRS. While a select few small financial institutions may be able 
to escape F ATCA, either because the American accounts of the institution 
do not exceed $50,000 or by refusing to maintain or open accounts for U.S. 
persons, this is the exception. 101 Larger and more prominent FFis do not 
realistically have the same option, because of the thirty-percent withholding 
penalty and the potential to be cut out of the largest equity and bond 
95. The Supreme Court has repeatedly proclaimed that Congress legislates solely for the 
territories of the United States, unless there is an express determination to the contrary. "[L ]egislation 
of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the U.S." Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). This canon of construction has been 
applied through much of our history. See, e.g., The Apollon, 22 U.S. 362, 370 (1824). The doctrine set 
out in The Apollon has evolved a great deal since 1824, however, since Justice Story wrote: "The laws 
of no nation can justly extend beyond its own territories except so far as regards its own citizens. They 
can have no force to control the sovereignty or rights of any other nation within its own jurisdiction." !d. 
96. FATCA Foreign Financial Institution (FFI) List Search and Download Tool, IRS (Dec. 
23, 2014), http://apps.irs.gov/app/fatcaFfiList/flu.jsf (last visited Jan. 23, 2015) (The names and 
jurisdictions of organization are updated each month by the IRS). 
97. !d. 
98. !d. 
99. See Richard Dyson, British Public is Footing a £Ibn Bill - to Aid the US Taxman, 
TELEGRAPH.CO.UK (July 4, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/investing/ 
1 0944585/British-public-footing-a-1 bn-bill-to-aid-the-US-taxman.htrnl (last visited Jan. 23, 2015). 
100. See id. 
101. See Annex I, 2(A)(4), supra note 78, at 2(A)(4). 
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markets in the world.102 FFis that resist the urge to fight back on F ATCA 
will be "granted uninterrupted access to the world's leading global financial 
institutions, major currencies, and securities markets."103 The choice is 
simple, or rather, there is no choice at all. A voiding and ignoring F ATCA 
will all but shut out non-compliant FFis from access to the U.S. dollar and 
many securities markets of the "FATCA compliant world."104 Thus, we 
will continue to see FFis succumb to the "hegemonic" might of the United 
States.105 
2. Bank Secrecy Laws and Intergovernmental Agreements 
The essence ofF ATCA is information reporting of account details for 
accounts in which the IRS has an interest.106 Reporting information 
includes the name of the U.S. person, the related Tax Identification 
Number, the account number for each such account, the highest balance in 
such accounts for the prior year, and the gross proceeds from such 
accounts. 107 In many developed nations, this information is protected as 
highly confidential.108 In Switzerland, as much of the movie-going public 
knows, releasing any portion of that information is a crime. 109 
102. Scratched by the FATCA, ECONOMIST (Nov. 24, 2011), available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/21540270?fsrc=scnltw/te/ar/scratchedbyfatca (last visited Jan. 23, 
2015). 
103. 
2014), 
Don Seymour, FATCA 's Good, Bad, Ugly Choices, PENSIONS & INvESTMENTS (Apr. 14, 
http://www. pionline.com/article/20 140414/PRINT/304149990/fatcas-good-bad-ugly-choices-
foreign-institutional-investors-face-new-extraterritorial-oversight?template=print (last visited, Jan. 25, 
2015). 
104. !d. 
105. !d. 
106. See 26 U.S.C. § 1471. 
107. !d. 
I 08. Aubert, supra note 23, at 273-76 
The civil obligation of Swiss banks to respect confidentiality of a client's account 
arises from three legal principles: the civil right to personal privacy, the 
contractual relationship between the customer and the bank, and specific statutory 
provisions governing bank secrecy. Penal and administrative sanctions apply to 
breaches of banking secrecy. [A]rticle 273 of the Penal Code prohibits acts of 
economic espionage by anyone, and this may be applied to bankers. The Banking 
Commission of Switzerland . . . can prevent any bank . . . from continuing 
operations if the bank fails to maintain confidentiality regarding clients' affairs. 
See also Swiss Banking Secrecy: Don't ask, won't tell, supra note 19 ("Swiss law entrenched bank 
secrecy in 1934, making it a criminal offense to reveal a client's identity."). 
I 09. Aubert, supra note, 23 at 273-76. 
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Pressure on Switzerland to adjust its bank secrecy laws has been 
increasing for decades. 110 Under the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption (UNCAC), which entered into force in December 2005, the 
parties undertake to criminalize bribery and corruption, to assist in 
enforcing other nations' laws, and to begin to seek return of national 
. treasure looted by corrupt politicians.111 Unlike the OECD Convention, 
Chapter V of the UNCAC deals explicitly with asset recovery. 112 
Currently, 140 nations have signed and ratified UNCAC, 113 including 
Switzerland, which was one of the initial signatories. 114 Much effort has 
recently been focused on funds thought to have been sequestered in Swiss 
banks. The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNDOC) together 
with the World Bank has established a Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) 
initiative. 115 A UNDOC publication describes efforts by the governments 
of Nigeria, Peru, and the Philippines to recover assets looted by former 
government officials in these countries and deposited in Swiss banks. 116 
One clear message from recent history in Switzerland is that bank 
secrecy is the major impediment to asset recovery. Legal proceedings in 
Switzerland relating to recovery of stolen Nigerian assets required five 
years of litigation.117 Recovery of stolen Philippine assets commenced in 
early 1986 and was finally concluded in 1998, following more than twelve 
years oflitigation.118 The Treasury Department has addressed this very real 
110. !d. at 282. 
Ill. See United Nations Convention Against Corruption, U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME 5 
(2004), available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-
50026_E.pdf(last visited Feb. 5, 2015). 
112. !d. at 42. 
113. United Nations Convention against Corruption Signature and Ratification Status as of I 2 
November 2014, U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME (2014), available at https://www.unodc.org/ 
unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2015). 
114. !d. 
115. Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR), WORLDBANK.ORG (2014), 
http://star.worldbank.org/star/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2015). 
116. Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative: Challenges, Opportunities, and Action Plan, U.N. 
OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME & WORLD BANK, 20-25 (2007), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/Star-rep-full.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2015). 
117. !d. at 18. 
118. !d. at 21; LARISSA GRAY ET AL., FEW AND FAR: THE HARD FACTS ON STOLEN ASSET 
RECOVERY 2 (2014), available at http://star. worldbank.org/star/publication/few-and-far-hard-facts-
stolen-asset-recovery (Further illustrating tbe difficulty of overcoming bank secrecy laws, UNODC 
reported in 2014 tbat in connection with anti-corruption efforts (rather tban tax evasion), oftbe $20 to 
$40 billion estimated to have been looted and sequestered offshore each year; a total of just $423.5 
million was recovered between 2006 and mid-2012. Of this only $166.5 million was recovered from 
Swiss banks.). 
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issue of local bank secrecy and personal privacy laws. 119 While FATCA 
seeks to have FFis secure waivers of privacy laws from U.S. persons 
holding accounts in the FFI, 120 the Treasury has greatly facilitated FFI 
compliance with local secrecy and privacy laws by negotiating 
Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs). 121 
Succinctly, IGAs are agreements negotiated by the Treasury with 
authorities in other nations. 122 There are several variations of these 
agreements, the most common and the most relevant for bank secrecy and 
overall F ATCA compliance purposes is the Model 1 I GA. 123 Pursuant to 
the Model 1 IGA, FFis in that jurisdiction provide information to their 
government, not directly to the IRS. 124 This IGA provides that the foreign 
government discloses the required information to the IRS on an automatic 
basis. 125 Model 1 ensures that the IRS is able to obtain "the same quality 
and quantity of information" as it would receive through full application of 
the final regulations. 126 The Model 2 IGA, which is much less common, 127 
provides that FFis report account information directly to the IRS. 128 The 
Treasury emphasizes the efficiency and effectiveness of the I GAs and how 
the multilateral agreements will enhance "transparency and information 
exchange on a global basis."129 
Model IGAs were designed to avoid any inconvenience that the 
Treasury might face with regards to other nations' bank secrecy lawsY0 
119. 78 Fed. Reg. at 5960. 
120. !d. 
121. 
122. 
123. 
124. 
125. 
126. 
If a participating FFI ... is prohibited by law from reporting the information 
required ... with respect to a U.S. account that it maintains unless a valid and 
effective waiver of such law is obtained, the participating FFI must request a valid 
and effective waiver. For accounts other than preexisting accounts, the 
participating FFI must obtain a valid and effective waiver upon opening the 
account or, if prohibitions on disclosures cannot by law be waived, the 
participating FFI must refrain from opening accounts that are U.S. accounts. 
!d. at 5877. 
/d. 
/d. 
78 Fed. Reg. at 5877. 
!d. 
!d. 
127. Thirteen countries have signed or have agreed to sign Model 2 IGAs. FA TCA Archive, 
U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/treaties/pages/ fatca-archive.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2015). 
128. 78 Fed. Reg. at 5877. 
129. /d. 
130. !d. 
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The I GAs allow the Treasury to sidestep any conflicts of law when strong-
arming FFis into releasing the requested account information. 131 This 
"collaboration" with foreign governments allows for FATCA to ensure that 
the objectives ofFATCA are fully met, regardless ofbank secrecy laws. 132 
Both IGA Model 1 and Model 2 aim to have the signing jurisdiction require· 
each financial institution within that jurisdiction collect and report the 
required information on U.S. accounts. 133 Foreign partner jurisdictions are 
apparently agreeing to enter IGAs with the U.S. based on incentives such as 
reduced burdens in applying F ATCA regulations and a promise of 
reciprocal information exchange by the IRS. 134 It turns out the United 
States is not the only country plagued by tax evasion, and the thought of 
discovering hidden accounts of their own citizens has nations the world 
over bowing to FA TCA. 135 Even bank secrecy standard setting Switzerland 
has signed on with F ATCA, albeit via a Model 2 rather than Model 1 IGA, 
requiring its financial institutions to report directly to the IRS. 136 It has 
been reported that Switzerland will renegotiate its arrangement with the IRS 
and conclude a Model 1 IGA. 137 
131. !d. 
132. !d. 
133. 78 Fed. Reg. at 5877. 
134. !d. (When a partner jurisdiction enters a Model 1 FATCA IGA with the United States, 
FFis in that jurisdiction will not be required to apply the final F ATCA regulations and will be treated as 
having met all due diligence requirements if in complete compliance with domestic laws enacted 
pursuant to the terms of the I GA. In jurisdictions where a Model 2 IGA is in place, FFis are required to 
comply with FATCA regulations unless modified by the agreement.). 
135. Nathan Newman, Explaining The Wormy Morass OfObama's FATCA Tax Evasion Law, 
FoRBES.COM (May 30, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/05/30/explaining-the-wormy-
morass-of-obamas-fatca-tax-evasion-Jaw/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2015) (Several Model I !GAs 
contemplate a degree of reciprocity in the information exchange regime. But this seemingly generous 
offer quickly fizzles out as anything remotely beneficial for partner jurisdictions when you realize that 
the United States is not required to look beyond wh.at are clearly shell corporations to extract beneficial 
account holder information, as is required by FFis under F ATCA. ). 
136. Agreement between the United States of America and Switzerland for Cooperation to 
Facilitate the Implementation of FATCA, U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY (Feb. 14, 2014), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties!Documents/FATCA-Agreement-
Switzerland-2-14-2013.pdf(last visited Feb. 5, 2015). 
13 7. See Jay R. Nanavati, Switzerland Announces Intention to Change from Model 2 IGA to 
Model 1, GLOBAL TAX ENFORCEMENT (Oct. 9, 2014), available at 
http://www.globaltaxenforcement.com/fatcalswitzerland-announces-intention-to-change-from-model-2-
iga-to-model-ll (last visited Jan. 22, 20 15). 
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V. THE PUBLIC OUTCRY 
As background, it is important to note that the United States and 
Eritrea are the only nations currently attempting to tax their citizens on their 
worldwide income. 138 Longstanding international practice has been to 
observe territorial limits on taxation, thus allowing citizens to pay taxes 
only in the jurisdiction in which they are residing. 139 
Few would dispute the need to bring federal government revenues 
closer to federal expenditures. Reducing expenditures is one apparently 
politically inconceivable route to this end; taxing offshore corporate profits 
is another; a wholesale revision ofthe IRC is another. 14° FATCA, however, 
takes yet another approach: that of seeking to tax offshore income of U.S. 
persons with offshore accounts. 141 Agreeing that this is commendable, it 
has turned out that the details of the IRS approach have offended millions. 
A. F ATCA and the Accidental American 
As noted, the United States imposes taxes based on citizenship rather 
than residency, meaning no matter where one lives, if one is a U.S. citizen, 
he or she must pay income taxes to the IRS. The United States deems all 
persons born in the territory of the United States to be citizens. 142 
Similarly, any child born outside the United States of one or more 
American parents is also deemed to be a citizen. 143 Regardless of when 
they left the United States and regardless of their knowledge of our unique 
basis for taxing, such "accidental" or "incidental" citizens are subject to the 
provisions of the IRC. 144 F ATCA, therefore, triggers FFI reporting 
obligations with respect to account holders who are among the estimated 
7,000,000 Americans who work and live overseas,145 persons residing in the 
138. Phil Hodgen, Does the US. Stand Alone?, HODGENLAW PC (May 15, 2012), 
http://hodgen.com/does-the-united-states-stand-alone/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2015). The Philippines taxes 
citizens living abroad only on income sourced from the Philippines. 
139. !d. 
140. See generally Chris Edwards, A Plan to Cut Federal Spending, CATO INSTITUTE (May 
2014), available at http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/sites/downsizinggovernment.org/files/pdf/ 
plan-to-cut-federal-spending. pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2015). 
141. See generally F ATCA FAQs, supra note 1. 
142. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815,829-30 (1971). 
143. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(c}-(d) (2012). 
144. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1401. 
145. Issues of Concern for US. Citizens Working Abroad, AMERICAN RESIDENTS WORKING 
ABROAD GROUP (ARWAG) (Mar. 2014}, available at https://americansabroad.org/ 
files/2813/645617161/final_arawg2.pdf(last visited Jan. 22, 2015). 
354 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 21:2 
United States who have offshore accounts (for any reason), as well as 
"accidental" or "incidental" citizens. 
To be perfectly clear, the IRS has always taxed citizens, as well as 
non-citizen residents, and FA TCA does not effect any change in the tax 
liability of its citizens and other U.S. persons. Rather, FATCA attempts to 
impose significant due diligence and reporting obligations upon FFis to 
determine whether they have account holders that qualify as U.S. 
persons.146 Therefore, FFis not otherwise subject to F ATCA, may fall 
under its rule simply because one or more accidental or incidental U.S. 
citizens-who themselves may be unaware of such status-are account 
holders at their institution. Fearing the penalties they may face, FFis are 
limiting or terminating the services they are willing to offer to U.S. 
citizens. 147 Some U.S. expatriates have received notice from their 
respective FFis informing them that their accounts will be closed due to 
"regulatory issues. "148 Though not the initial primary target ofF ATCA, the 
millions of Americans living abroad are now faced with the decision of 
whether or not to remain citizens of the United States. 149 
Renunciation of U.S. citizenship is an extreme measure and "the most 
unequivocal way in which a person can manifest an intention to relinquish 
U.S. citizenship.150 Yet, in 2013, nearly 3,000 Americans made the 
decision to tum in their passports and leave their American citizenship 
behind, 151 a number up 221% from the previous year. 152 By the end of 
146. See generally FATCA FAQs, supra note I. 
147. See, e.g., Siri Srinivas, '/was terrified we'd lose all our money': banks tell US customers 
they won't work with Americans, GUARDIAN (Sept. 24, 2014), available at http://www.theguardian.com/ 
money/20 14/sep/24/americans-chased-by-irs-give-up-citizenship-after-being-forced-out-of-bank-
accounts (last visited Jan. 22, 2015). 
148. /d. 
149. /d. 
150. Renunciation of U.S. Nationality, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, http://travel.state.gov/ 
content/traveVenglish/legal-considerations/us-citizenship-laws-policies/renunciation-of-citizenship.html 
(last visited Feb. I, 20 15). 
151. Srinivas, supra note 14 7. 
152. Robert W. Wood, Americans Renouncing Citizenship Up 221%, All Aboard The FATCA 
Express, FORBES.COM (Feb. 6, 2014), available at http://www.forbes.com/siteslrobertwood/ 
20 14/02/06/americans-renouncing-citizenship-up-221-all-aboard-the-fatca-express/ (last visited Jan. 22, 
20 15); see also Laura Saunders, Record Number Gave Up U.S. Citizenship or Long-Term Residency in 2014, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 10, 2015), available at http://www.wsj.com/articleslreconl-number-gave-up-u-s-
citizenship-or-long-term-residency-1423582726 (last visited Feb. 18, 2015); see generally Quarterly 
Publication of Individuals, Who Have Chosen To Expatriate, as Required by Section 60390, Nat'! Archives 
and Rec's Admin. (Feb. II, 2015), https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/02/ll/2015-
02850/quarterly-publication-of-individuals-who-have-chosen-to-expatriate-as-required-by-section-
6039g#page-7700 (last visited Feb. 18, 2015). 
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2014, 3,415 former U.S. citizens had effectively lost their citizenship,153 
and a survey conducted by the deVere Group revealed that 5.5 million 
expatriates are contemplating passport relinquishment. 154 The cost of 
renunciation is high, 155 but clearly some have determined that a U.S. 
passport is not worth the accompanying hassle. 
B. Not Just Financial Institutions and American Expatriates 
1. The British 
While we can understand why FFis must agree to whatever the IRS 
demands to avoid the thirty percent withholding, customers of FFis who 
have no U.S. connection whatsoever find themselves required to complete 
IRS Form W-8 BEN. 156 Wait! "Under penalties of perjury" those without 
any U.S. connection must prove they are not U.S. persons? Does this take 
extraterritoriality to a new level? Was Congress so crazy that it not only 
imposed significant obligations on tens of thousands of FFis, but it also 
requires perhaps hundreds of millions of their customers to prove they are 
not subject to U.S. tax rules? 
JP Morgan Asset Management in London sent 125,000 requests for 
c.ompletion of the W -8BEN to its clients. 157 This form, entitled "Certificate 
of Foreign Status of Beneficial Owner for U.S. Tax Withholding and 
Reporting (Individuals)," requests that clients certify that they are not a 
U.S. citizen or a U.S. person.158 The form begins with the following typical 
user-friendly instructions: 
153. Robert W. Wood, Americans Renounce Citizenship In New Record Numbers, 
FORBES.COM (Oct. 30, 2014), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/ 
2014/1 0/30/americans-renounce-citizenship-in-record-numbers-why-you-should-care/ (last visited Jan. 
22, 2015) [hereinafter Americans Renounce Citizenship]. 
154. Robert W. Wood, 5.5 Million Americans Eye Giving Up U.S. Citizenship, Survey Reveals, 
FORBES.COM (Oct. 27, 2014), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2014/10/27/5-5-
million-americans-eye-giving-up-u-s-citizenship-survey-reveals/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2015). 
155. Renunciation requires proof of U.S. tax compliance for the five years preceding 
renunciation, payment of an exit tax, payment of a steep renunciation fee, and other possible penalties. 
Expatriation Tax, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/Intemational-Taxpayers/Expatriation-Tax (last 
visited Feb. 7, 20 15). 
156. IRS Form W-8BEN, IRS, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdfi'fw8ben.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2015). 
157. Richard Dyson, Why are British investors being forced to fill in US tax forms, 
TELEGRAPH.Co.UK (May 30, 2014), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/fmance/persona1finance/ 
investing/funds/ I 0864539/Why-are-British-investors-being-forced-to-fill-in-US-tax-forms.htm1 (last 
visited Jan 22, 20 15). 
158. IRS Form W-8BEN, supra note 156. 
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Do NOT use this form if: 
You are NOT an individual; 
You are a U.S. citizen or other U.S. person, including a resident 
alien individual; 
You are a beneficial owner claiming that income is effectively 
connected with the conduct of trade or business in the U.S.; 
You are a beneficial owner who is receiving compensation for 
personal services performed in the United States; 
A person acting as an intermediary. 159 
Part I of this form seeks the name and address of the individual. Part 
II, however, is entitled "Claim of Tax Treaty Benefits (for Chapter 3 
purposes only)." Part II begins: "I certify that the beneficial owner is a 
resident of within the meaning of the income tax treaty between 
the U.S. and that country."160 
While the IRS certainly has to be thorough and precise in 
implementing F ATCA, was the IRS reasonable in assuming that an 
individual completing a W -8BEN has read Chapter 3 of the relevant tax 
treaty or suspecting that such person had a clue there was such a treaty that 
applied to them? It is easy to imagine the reaction of an American citizen 
receiving a similar notice from Russian, Chinese, or Zimbabawean tax 
authorities. 
London's mayor, Boris Johnson, has strongly criticized the global tax 
regime of the United States, calling the practice of taxing citizens on 
worldwide income "outrageous."161 Born in New York, and thus a U.S. 
citizen, Johnson faces U.S. tax liability on the sale of his U.K. home. 162 He 
has refused to pay the tax, joining the many expatriates and accidental 
Americans throughout the world who are voicing their anger at the law, 
calling it a "terrible doctrine oftaxation."163 
159. See Dyson, supra note 157 (The author of a column in the London Telegraph compared 
the W-8BEN to forms required of those subject to HM Revenue & Customs and noted that the IRS' 
form "makes HMRC's jargon-strewn documents look by comparison intelligible and human."). 
160. See IRS Form W-8BEN, supra note 156. 
161. Robert W. Wood, Mayor Boris Johnson's Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad 
Day ... As An American, FORBES.COM (Nov. 18, 2014), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
robertwood/20 14/11/18/mayor -boris-johnsons-terrible-horrible-no-good-very-bad-day-as-an-americanl 
(last visited Jan. 22, 20 15). 
162. Id. 
163. Nigel Green, In Support of Boris Johnson: The US's Imperialistic Foreign Tax Law Helps 
No One, CITY A.M. (Dec. 10, 2014), available at http://www.cityarn.com/1418246339/support-boris-
johnson-us-s-imperialistic-foreign-tax-law-helps-no-one (last visited Jan. 22, 2015). 
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2. The Canadians 
There are many Americans, or "U.S. persons" for IRS purposes, living 
in Canada. Focusing on FATCA in Canada is useful because two 
Canadians have filed a claim164 against the Canadian government asserting 
that the IGA entered into by the United States and Canada165 to implement 
FA TCA violates several provisions of the Constitution of Canada, 166 
including Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms,167 the Income Tax Act 
of Canada, 168 and the Canada-U.S. Tax Treaty. 169 The agreement requires 
Canadian FFis to hand over information on qualifying accounts to Canadian 
tax authorities, who will in tum submit the information to the IRS. 170 
This litigation is being crowd funded by the "Alliance for the Defence 
of Canadian Sovereignty."171 In a press release the group asserts that 
FACT A " . . . makes it mandatory for the Government of Canada to 
discriminate against Canadian citizens and residents, whom the U.S. deems 
to be 'U.S. persons,' by turning over their private bank account information 
to the U.S. IRS."172 The two plaintiffs were born in the United States. 173 
Each left the United States at the age of five and neither has returned 
164. Hillis v. AGC, T-1736-14 (C.T.C.) (Can.). 
165. Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the U.S. of 
America to Improve International Tax Compliance through Enhanced Exchange of Information under 
the Convention Between the U.S. of America and Canada with Respect to Taxes on Income and on 
Capital, CAN. DEP'T. OF FIN. (Feb. 5, 2014), available at http://www.fin.gc.ca/treaties-
conventions/pdf/FATCA-eng.pdf(last visited Jan. 22, 2015). 
166. See generally Hillis, T-1736-14 (Can.). 
167. See id. at 15-17. 
168. See id. at 7. 
169. See id. 
170. See Robert W. Wood, Canada Signs U.S. FATCA Deal, IRS To Get Data, FORBES.COM 
(Feb. 7, 2014), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2014/02/07/canada-hungary-sign-
u-s-fatca-deals-irs-to-get-data/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2015). 
171. Robert W. Wood, Canadians File Suit To Block FATCA And Prohibit Handover Of US. 
Names To IRS, FORBES.COM (Aug. 12, 2014), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/ 
20 14/08/12/canadians-file-suit-to-block -fatca-and-prohibit-handover-of-u-s-names/ (last visited Jan. 22, 
2015). 
172. Press Release, Alliance for Defense of Canadian Sovereignty, Minister of National 
Revenue added as defendant in Canadian FATCA lawsuit (Oct. 9, 2019) available at 
https://adcsovereignty.files.wordpress.com/2014/1 0/adcs _prr _ oct9 _ 20 l4l.pdf. (last visited Jan. 22, 
2015). 
173. See Ama Sarfo, US. Expats Sue Canadian Gov't Over FATCA Cooperation, LAW 360 
(20 14 ), available at http://www.law360.com/articles/566464/us-expats-sue-canadian-gov-t-over-fa tea-
cooperation (last visited Feb. 5, 2015). 
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since. 174 Neither has a U.S. passport and neither has ever filed a tax return 
with the IRS. 175 One of the plaintiffs was born in the United States but is a 
Canadian resident.176 The other was married to a Canadian citizen and 
owned a graphic design company in Canada. 177 One of the plaintiffs states 
she has no accounts in a Canadian financial institution in excess of $50,000, 
("Low Value Account" under FATCA). 178 The other has at least one 
account that exceeds $50,000 but is less than $1,000,000 (a "Lower Value 
Account" under FATCA). 179 The claim states that by agreeing with the 
United States in its Model 1 IGA to collect and report to the IRS personal 
and financial information on Canadian account holders, Canada has 
violated Canadian law. 180 
Specifically, the claim asserts that the Model 1 IGA entered into by 
Canada and the United States violates the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, a document akin to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the 
U.S. Constitution, which grants the "right to life, liberty, security of person; 
security against unreasonable search and seizure; [and] equal protection of 
law without discrimination."181 Additionally, there is concern that the 
agreement disregards the principle of maintaining sovereignty. 182 The 
claimants and many other Americans living in Canada feel "entrapped in 
U.S. citizenship" and that their rights are being violated as they are 
"branded" potential tax evaders. 183 
While the claimants are being applauded and supported by their fellow 
Canadian-American FATCA haters, there may very well be a harsh reality 
waiting on the other side of the lawsuit. A successful lawsuit will not make 
F ATCA go away. It will not make the fact that these Canadian-Americans 
have U.S. tax liability go away. 184 And it will not return them to the 
174. Jd. 
175. /d. 
176. /d. 
177. /d. 
178. Annex I, supra note 78, at 2. 
179. !d. 
180. See generally id. 
181. Canadians File Suit To Block FATCA And Prohibit Handover Of US. Names To IRS, 
supra note 171. 
182. See generally id. 
183. /d. 
184. Julius Melnitzer, Canadian-US. Dual Citizens Could Be Worse Off If FATCA Lawsuit 
Succeeds, FIN. POST (Aug. 18, 2014), available at http://business.financialpost.corn!2014/08/18/canada-
u-s-dual-citizens-could-be-worse-off-if-fatca-lawsuit-succeeds/# _federated= 1 (last visited Jan. 22, 
2015). 
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blissful ignorance of a "pre-FATCA world."185 The U.S.-Canadian IGA, in 
actuality, protects the plaintiffs and others from the full effects of 
F ATCA.186 If found invalid under the Canadian Constitution, the IGA will 
disappear, but Canadian financial institutions are not about to ignore 
FATCA and miss out on U.S. capital markets; most will likely turn around 
and hand the information directly to the IRS, rather than through the 
Canadian Government. 187 So while the plaintiffs can refuse to sign a 
waiver allowing release of their information, they will probably find 
themselves without a bank willing to work with "recalcitrant" account 
holders. 188 
VI. WHAT HAPPENS Now? FATCAAND THE 
FUTURE OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
FATCA has gone where no U.S. law has gone before. It has brought 
on a new age of international cooperation (read: coercion) in tax 
enforcement and information exchange, and while its objectives may be the 
same as prior initiatives, 189 the impact of FATCA will reach well beyond 
the offshore accounts of U.S. persons and into the dark comers of the 
banking world. Initial projections that the firm hand of F ATCA would 
push other countries to create an alternative market completely void of U.S. 
portfolios have fizzled out. 190 The "Age ofF A TCA" is upon us, changing 
the international banking scene for good. 191 
185. Jd. 
186. Jd. 
187. See id. Canadian financial institutions will face violating Canadian law in doing so, but 
the Canadian Government is not likely to sit quietly as the IGA is tom to pieces. In all likelihood, the 
Canadian Government will amend legislation to allow for this or fmd another way around. 
188. Id. A "recalcitrant account holder" refers to "any holder of an account maintained by an 
FFI if such account holder is not an FFI ... and (i) the account holder fails to comply with requests by 
the FFI for the documentation or information required ... for determining the status of such account as a 
U.S. account." 26 C.F.R. § 1.1471-5(g). 
189. Annex I, supra note 78, at 1. 
190. G. Warren Whitaker, FATCA and the future, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (June 2013), 
available at http://www.financierworldwide.com/fatca-and-the-future/#.VHDgH1bVvBd (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2015). 
191. Jd. 
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A. The Erosion of Bank Secrecy Laws 
Tax havens are likely a thing of the past, at least for Americans. 192 
Bank secrecy laws are being eroded at the aggressive hand of F ATCA and 
hidden offshore bank accounts may soon be something we read of only in 
history books. As discussed above, FA TCA requires FFis to release 
information regarding U.S. persons who hold accounts with their 
institutions. 193 Failure to comply with FATCA by releasing the information 
or by entering an IGA with the Department of Treasury results in a thirty-
percent penalty withholding on all U.S. source payments. 194 Even if the FFI 
refuses to release the requested information, under the majority ofiGAs the 
IRS can issue a "request for administrative assistance," and force 
compliance through the FFI's home government. 195 
What is the effect of foreign bank secrecy laws? Are FFis expected to 
bow down to the long arm of the IRS, a branch of a government with no 
jurisdictional nexus to the institution, under threat of potential criminal 
sanctions? As one example, Article 4 of the current IGA between the 
United States and Switzerland contains an enabling clause, which states 
that, "Swiss Financial Institutions that, pursuant to applicable U.S. Treasury 
Regulations, enter into an FFI Agreement with the IRS or register with the 
IRS as deemed-compliant FFis, are authorized and therefore not liable to 
any penalty according to Article 271 of the Swiss Criminal Code."196 The 
Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) has even warned 
FFis to comply with F ATCA and "not to engage in any action to get around 
F ATCA."197 
Switzerland recently announced its intention to negotiate a new IGA 
based on the Model 1 agreement to replace the current U.S.-Switzerland 
Model2 IGA signed in 2013.198 It is unclear what the reason or motive is 
192. See John Letzing, Swiss Banks Say Goodbye to a Big Chunk of Bank Secrecy, WALL ST. J. 
(July 1, 20 14), available at http:/ lblogs. wsj .com/moneybeat/20 14/07/0 1/swiss-banks-say-goodbye-to-a-
big-chunk-of-bank-secrecy/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2015). 
193. Annex I, supra note 78, at I. 
194. Id. 
195. Armando Mombelli, Swiss banks to tell all under FATCA, SWISSINFO.CH (June 30, 2014), 
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/multimedialswiss-banks-to-tell-all-under-fatca/40473870 (last visited Jan. 
22, 2015). 
196. Agreement between the United States of America and Switzerland for Cooperation to 
Facilitate Impl ..... entation ofFATCA, supra note 136, at art. 4 (emphasis added). 
197. Mombelli, supra note 195. 
198. The announcement was made on Oct. 8, 2014. At the time this article was written, the 
original Model 2 agreement between the United States and Switzerland was in effect. Nanavati, supra 
note 137. 
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behind negotiating a Model 1 IGA, but the switch would be consistent with 
the trend among other nations opting for Model 1 agreements. 199 The 
switch poses the question of what impact such an agreement will have on 
Swiss criminal law, as a Modell IGA contemplates the automatic exchange 
of information between the United States and the foreign signing 
jurisdiction.20° Currently, the release of account holder information, 
without consent, by Swiss financial institutions is punishable under both 
civil and criminal law, but punishment may be absolved by either statutory 
provision or court order in specific criminal investigations.Z01 In effect, the 
Model 1 IGA will override Swiss civil and criminal law by authorizing the 
release of domestically protected information. The specifics of the 
interplay between Swiss criminal law and a Model 1 IGA are beyond the 
scope of this article, but the fact that a nation historically recognized for its 
privacy laws is willing to reform, and make major exceptions to its criminal 
laws speaks volumes about the extraterritorial impact ofF ACT A. 
Lebanon, once deemed the "Switzerland of the Middle East" for its 
similarly protective bank secrecy laws, at first seemed to stand strong 
against the pressures of FA TCA, the one jurisdiction to put its customers 
first and maintain the integrity of its bank secrecy laws.202 The governor of 
Lebanon's Central Bank even went as far as to recommend that banks 
remain non-compliant and accept the penalty for failure to release the 
information.203 But Lebanon's national currency is closely tied to the U.S. 
dollar.204 Further, Lebanon is a nation where 75% of transactions are 
199. As of November 22, 2014, Switzerland is one of only seven countries to have a Model 2 
IGA in effect. The other countries include Austria, Bermuda, Chile, Hong Kong, Japan, and Moldovia. 
Gregory C. Walsh, eta!., The Latest Model, STEP J. (May 2013), http://www.step.org/latest-model (last 
visited Jan. 22, 20 15). 
200. !d. The original Model 2 IGA requires FFis to obtain consent for release of information 
from accoimt holders. Consequences for refusing consent include "aggregate reporting, an IRS group 
request to the FTA as the Swiss competent authority, transmission by the FI of account information to 
the FTA, and exchange of such information by the FTA with the IRS.". 
201. Some facts about Swiss banking secrecy, ASSET PROTECTION CORPORATION, 
http://www.assetprotectioncorp.com/swissbanking.htrnl (last visited Jan. 22, 2015). 
202. Reem Ramzi Hachache, Lebanon- "The Switzerland of the Middle East" YOUR MIDDLE 
EAST (Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/features/lebanon-the-switzerland-of-the-middle-
east_l2495 (last visited Jan. 22, 2015). 
203. Aidan J. Delgado & Vincent J. Guglielmotti, FATCA Compliance Challenges Lebanese 
Bank Secrecy Laws, BROWNRUDNICK (May 22, 2013), http://www.brownrudnick.com/news-resources-
detail/20 13-05-fatca-compliance-challenges-lebanese-bank-secrecy-laws (last visited Jan. 22, 20 15). 
204. The Lebanese Pound is pegged to the U.S. Dollar at I USD = 1,507.5 LBP. Lebanese 
Pound, OANDA, available at http://www.oanda.com/currency/iso-currency-codes/LBP (last visited Jan. 
22, 2015). A "currency peg" is defined as a "country or government's exchange rate policy of pegging 
the central bank's rate of exchange to another country's currency." See Currency Peg, INvESTOPEDIA, 
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conducted in U.S. dollars.205 Thus, resisting FATCA is impractical. While 
Lebanon and the IRS have not entered into an IGA, over one hundred 
Lebanese FFis have registered to comply with FATCA.206 Compliant 
banks will require U.S. account holders to sign a bank secrecy waiver and a 
withholding certificate, and are prepared to subject recalcitrant account 
holders to withholding or account closure.207 
Despite long histories of strong bank secrecy laws designed to protect 
the privacy of account holders, the traditional tax havens of the world are 
effectively eliminating bank secrecy when it comes to American account 
holders. FA TCA is essentially a demand that the banks of the world throw 
secrecy practices out the window,208 and despite the steep cost of 
compliance,2°9 FFis are complying. Facing the 30% withholding penalty 
for non-compliance, FFis risk subjecting U.S. account holder income to a 
higher withholding percentage than might be imposed if the income was 
properly reported to the IRS by the account holder.210 At the cost oflosing 
customers, FFis are seemingly willing to strip U.S. persons of their privacy 
rights under domestic law in order to "circumvent ... privacy laws without 
creating a conflict of law" and "continue to enjoy favorable tax treatment 
by the U.S."211 
B. Global Information Exchange 
It is difficult to imagine a situation where the United States would get 
away with something so internationally invasive and draconian as FA TCA 
without the rest of the world wanting to reap the benefits as well. The 
United States is not the only country in the world with a tax evasion 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/currency-peg.asp (last visited Jan. 22, 2015); see also Elias Sakr, 
Lebanese Banks Help U.S. in Fight Against Tax Evasion, DAILY STAR LEB. (June 10, 2014), available 
at http:/ /www.dailystar. com.lb/Business/Lebanon/20 14/ Jun-1 0/2594 70-lebanese-banks-help-us-in-fight-
against-tax-evasion.ashx#axzz3Im8iz21E (last visited Jan. 22, 2015). 
205. Sakr, supra note 204. 
206. /d. 
207. /d. 
208. See Valentin Katasonov, What's Behind the Campaign to Combat Bank Secrecy, 
STRATEGIC CULTURE FOUNDATION (May 15, 2014), http:/lm.strategic-culture.org/news/2014/05/15/ 
what-behind-the-campaign-to-combat-banking-secrecy.html (last visited Jan. 22, 20 15). 
209. The cost of compliance is estimated to be between $30 and $80 million per firm. Mark R. 
Van Heukelom, The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act and Foreign Insurance Companies: Better 
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issue.212 It is expected that other jurisdictions will follow suit. The appeal 
of international information exchange has had a strong pull on nations 
whose citizens have historically found refuge in the banking secrecy 
meccas of the world. As FA TCA comes into effect and the benefits more 
fully realized, new programs and initiatives are likely to develop in other 
nations. 
1. Son ofFATCA 
The network of IGAs that the IRS has signed with other jurisdictions 
has created a means for the IRS to collect information necessary to force 
tax compliance among offshore account holders.213 The United Kingdom 
became the first nation to enter an IGA with the United States in September 
2012.214 Shortly after signing the agreement, the United Kingdom 
announced that the U.S.-U.K. FATCA agreement would serve as a model 
for agreements to be entered into between the United Kingdom and its 
Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories.215 This FACTA-like 
program, colloquially referred to as the "son ofFATCA," similarly requires 
the automatic reporting by financial institutions of U.K. resident account 
holder information.216 Taking a step away from the traditional residency-
212. See Vanessa Houlder, UK Tax Gap Climbs to £34bn, FIN. TiMES (Oct. 16, 2014), available 
at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/48d5a518-552a-lle4-b616-00144feab7de.html#axzz3 ImmOqYvc (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2015) ("Business alid individuals paid £34bn less tax than they should have done in 
2012-2013."). 
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214. !d.; Agreement Between the Government of the U.S. of America and the Government of 
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and to Implement FATCA, U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY (Sept. 12, 2012), available at 
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2012.pdf(last visited Feb. 4, 2015). 
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based taxing regime,217 the law applies to "all funds located in U.K. IGA 
jurisdictions regardless of where the managers of those funds are located or 
whether such funds ... receive U.K. source income.'m8 A distinct 
difference is that the U.K. FATCA agreements do not impose a withholding 
penalty for failure to comply, an apparently unnecessary component given 
the "sufficient political power" of the United Kingdom over its Crown 
Dependencies and Overseas Territories.219 
2. Global Standard for Automatic Exchange of 
Financial Account Information 
The United Kingdom continued to be a proactive player in the 
development of global information sharing by heading a pilot program for 
automatic exchange of financial information with the "Western European 
G5"-United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, France, and Spain.220 Riding the 
tail of F ATCA, the program grew rapidly and was adopted by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which 
has since developed a "common reporting standard" (Standard) aimed at 
"prevent[ing] the development of numerous competing standards for 
information exchange, and in doing so minimise potential costs and 
administrative burden for the financial sector."221 As of October 29,2014, 
fifty-one jurisdictions had endorsed the standard by signing a multilateral 
competent authority agreement. 222 
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The Standard contains two elements: (1) a common reporting standard 
(CRS) and (2) a model competent authority agreement (Model CAA).223 
The CRS, to be implemented into domestic law by each subscribing 
jurisdiction, provides "due diligence and reporting procedures" for financial 
institutions.224 It requires financial institutions225 to report account226 
information227 regarding account holders who are tax residents of a 
participating jurisdiction to authorities in those respective jurisdictions.228 
The CRS is closely modeled after and draws from the FATCA IGA, with a 
particular focus on the concept of citizenship-based taxation-an approach 
long employed the by United States.229 The common standard is aimed at 
achieving the effective and efficient global exchange of information while 
lowering the cost of compliance.230 
The OECD provides what it believes to be factors necessary for a 
successful global information exchange regime: · 
(1) a common standard on information reporting, due diligence 
and exchange of information; 
(2) a legal and operational basis for the exchange of information; 
and 
(3) common or compatible technical solutions.231 
Of particular interest is the legal basis for the exchange of information. The 
OECD suggests that the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative 
Switzerland, have expressed their commitment to implementing the Global Standard to specific 
timetables and other countries are invited to join as well. /d. 
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Assistance in Tax Matters can serve as an effective and efficient basis for 
the multilateral exchange of information, providing strict confidentiality 
and information-use rules while allowing automatic information 
exchange.232 The convention requires parties to enter a separate agreement, 
but agreements may be entered into by more than two parties, creating a 
single agreement with global reach.233 
With the emergence of the CRS, U.S. citizens may not be the only 
ones missing out on the advantage of offshore accounts. The OECD has 
taken FA TCA and created a global standard for information exchange that 
is being rapidly adopted by many nations around the world.234 With this 
standard, the beginning of the end of tax avoidance is upon us. The days of 
secret financial accounts are numbered, and not just for Americans. 
C. Decline of the Dollar 
F ATCA reporting requirements at first appear relatively routine and 
hardly conjure up concerns for a "financial Armageddon."235 But it does 
warrant a moment of discussion when "trillions of dollars in cross-border 
investing" will suddenly be subject to heightened scrutiny.236 While July 1, 
2014 did not bring a complete and automatic collapse of the dollar, 
FATCA's long-term impact on the dollar as the global standard for 
economic transactions looks grim by most accounts.237 Some looking to 
avoid the headache of FATCA will likely take their investments to other 
countries, while international brokers, banks, and insurance companies will 
focus their efforts on less regulated markets abroad.238 There is a legitimate 
concern that financial institutions will "opt out of the dollar-denominated 
transactions or not accept U.S. accounts" as a result of FATCA and its 
extensive requirements.239 
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The growing trend of independence from the dollar-dominated global 
economy has been further bolstered by the creation of the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AilB), a $100 billion bank backed by 
China and India.240 The AilB is a challenge to the prominent World Bank 
and Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the "first serious institutional 
challenge to the global economic order."241 To no one's surprise, the 
United States has voiced concerns and opposition regarding the new bank, 
primarily that it is unlikely that the bank will be able to "promote good 
environmental, procurement and human rights standards" as compared to 
the World Bank and ADB.242 To hear China tell it, the United States' 
opposition is merely "an attempt to contain the global rise of China and its 
ambition to remain the dominant power of Asia."243 Regardless of the basis 
for concern, the reality is that as the United States continues to impose its 
regulations on the rest of the world as it has done with F ATCA, the reaction 
will continue to be the development of strategies to replace the dollar as the 
de facto currency of the world.244 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Government has taken a bold step with FATCA. The 
legislation is by far the most egregious example of extraterritorial overreach 
in history and has been harshly criticized by individuals and entities alike. 
Yet, the initial anger expressed by liable taxpayers and fmancial institutions 
throughout the world has resulted largely in submission to regulation, even 
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overdollaring as: 
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"overdollaring'"). Prime examples of this are oil and other commodities. Net 
exchange rates and transactions costs and conditions may also be changed 
(lowered in favor of the buyer}, which can increase the pace at which trades flow. 
Most overdollaring techniques increase commodity consumption, generating 
more inflation, which effects must be dispersed if the source economy is to 
remain operational. Jd. 
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absent jurisdictional authority. While the goal ofFATCA is to increase tax 
compliance among American foreign account holders, its effects have been, 
and will continue to be, felt on a global level. As evidenced by the 
emergence of several copycat initiatives, FATCA's impact on global 
information exchange has the potential to foster international collaboration 
on tax matters and substantially reduce tax evasion. Offshore accounts 
have long been a thorn in the side for the IRS and other tax authorities that 
fear they are missing out on billions, and FA TCA may in fact be one 
answer to their problems. 
